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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JAKOB FRIEDRICH FRIES
( 1773-1843): ITS CONTEXT,
NATIJRE, AND HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE
DAVID E. LEARY
University of New Hampshire

Most German philosophers in the early nineteenth century
were devoted, to the idealistic « completion » of Immanuel
Kant's critical philosophy. A few independent philosophers, however, were preoccupied with the elaboration of a non-idealistic,
and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among the
earliest opponents of the speculativ~ idealists was Jakob Fried~ich Fries (1773-1843), a philosopher of wide-ranging interests who might have had a much greater impact upon the
course of German philosophy had his liberal political affiliations not curtailed his academic career. As it was, his influence
was considerable anyway. One aspect of this influence is of
particular interest: in his reaction against idealism, and in his
own « completion » of Kant, Fries laid the foundation for the
development and acceptance of psychology as an independent
science.
Like the idealists, Fries acknowledged Kant as his most important predecessor. In fact, he claimed that he alone was the
true follower of Kant since he alone had developed the ,critical
basis rather than the speculative implications of Kant's philosophy. Maintaining that knowledge of the transcendent is impossible, Fries rejected the attempts of the idealists to reduce reality to a system of absolute truths. Instead he concentrated, as
did Kant, upon the discovery of the critical bases of knowledge. Methodologically, he relied upon analitical, descriptive,
and deductive procedures rather than the constructive metaphysical reasoning of the idealists. In the course of his efforts, he
contributed new procedures and distinctions to the critical philosophy, and he came to the conclusion that psychology is the
The preparation of this research article was supported by a grant from the
United States National Science Foundation (Grant No. SES-8008051).
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funclamehtal science and ihe foundation of philosophy. Having
established. the critical foundation of khowledge by means of
psychology~ he' proceeded, as Kant had intended, to develop a
system of metaphysics which, he claimed, remained within the
limits of human understanding. He also developed the
« psychic anthropology » by which he hoped to establish psychology upon a steady and lasting foundation. Through all these
endeavors, he brought to the fore the conceptual possibility of.
a scientific psychology.

THE RELATION OF FRIES AND HIS WORK TO EARLY
NINETEENTH-CENTURY GERMAN PHILOSOPHY

Fries began his philosophical ruminations while a student at
the Moravian Academy- in Herrenhut 1 • From 1792 to 1795,
he was taught Kantian philosophy as interpreted by Karl Leonhard Reinhold. Reinhold (1971) stressed the p,rinciple of consciousness as the immediate and irreducible fact of philosophy.
He also emphasized that the goal of philosophy was to give a
descriptive accouht of consciousness, or a «phenomenology».
That wh1ch is a priori in consciousness, Reinhold maintained,
cannot be proven; it can only be discovered and described.
These tenets of Reinhold had a very significant influence upon
Fries's thought, but Fries was not completely satisfied with
Reinhold's .interpretation of Kant. For that reason, Fries began
his own critical .reaqing of Kant's works, seeking to discover
not only what Kant 4imself·had saia: but, more importantly,
hdw Kant had come .to hiS conclusions. 'fhus, from the very
beginning wh~n 'Fries was f1rst attracted to philosophy (and
away from the dogmatic sys~em of the Moravians), it was the
fundamental issue of methodology that interested Fries.
This interest was further' developed when Fries left the Moravians in 1795 and went to Leipzig to study philosophy. There
he came under the influence of Ernst Platner (1772; 2d rev.
ed., 1790), a philosopher with medical and psycholpgical interests who. stressed the importance of empiricism in the form of
·self-observation. Platner thus not only reinforced Reinhold's si-

1 The biographical details regarding Fries have been gathered primarily from
Henke (i867J and. Eggeling (1878).
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mjlar empha.sjs· upqn self-observat!on, ,he "al~o contributed ~o
the psyc;hplogical so}utio,n of Fries'~ inqeasjng ~9t.icerp 51~out
the critical justification of t~e ,critical method 1ts~lf. f..lso at
Leipzig, Fries came into co.o.ttict w_ith the ~hought of .Friedrich
Heinrich Jacqbi (1787; 2d ed., 1~15.1. Jacopi's philosophy
of faith ~nd feeling corroqqrated _;tl;ie pie~fstic infl"\!ence 'Yhich
the Moravians h_~d ,had ~pop. Fries. F~icrs 1 s conv,mction that
knowledge is ultimately based upon a feeling, or immediat<::
cognition, and .that the no~menal existence 'of the t~lqgs wpich
appear to us can only be- ~Qnfirmed l:>Y faith, js a Cb11seq,uenc~
of this dual heritage of Pietism and Jacobian philosophy.
From Jacobi, too, came another reinforcemeJ?~ of ~he impqrtance
of self-observation. This theme, which was to, be· central to
Fries's psychologkal development of Kant's critica( pbil~~ophy,
can thus be traced to the combined influence of Reit;iliold, Platn~r, and Jaco.bi. Despi~e Fries's objection to cert!).in a~pects
of the thougl;it of each of these philosophers, it can therefore
be ~aid that the positive basis of Fries's « corppletioµ >? of
Kant was pi:ovided, by Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi.
The negative basis - that against wJ:iich Fries reacted at
the beginning of his philosophical d~v,elopment - was the i<lea;
listic philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (17~4). 'Fries.. beca-·
me well acquainti;;d with thi~ philosophical system in 1797 af~
ter he transfe,rreP, .to Jena ~xplicitly in orQ.e~ t<? stupy wjih
Fichte. From the start .Fichfe's specula.tive discourses aroµsed
Fries's opp_osition. Fries habitually retyrned t9- his room ~fter
Fichte's lectures and wrote point-by-point requtt,als. This. pr~cti
ce in written polemic served Eries w~ll when'iii 1803 l;,e·wrqte
Reinhold, Fichte,._ und Schelling, his very ~Hectfve,. di~tribe
against the id~alistic tendencies in post-Kantiim pljilosophJl
This work brougpt Fries a good deal of notice ,and, a rep11t,ation as one of the more brilliant up-and-coming young philosophers.
. , ,
Well before that ..time, however, Frie~ U 79-S_a, b, c, cl, e)
had already established the col).structive basis of his. later w9rk
in a series of five artis;les. As a portept ?f 'thiqgs }O colll}!,, a}l
these articles dealt with psycpology and, to varying degrc::.es,
with the issue of the relation between _psychology, met.aphysics, and the critical philosophy. The ;most significant of th~se
articl~, " Dbet 4as Verhaltnis der empirischen Psy<;hclogie
zur Metaphysik" .(Qn the Relation of EmpiricaLP~ycllolog~ Fo
Metaphysics), provides an excellent summary, of'-Fr~es'& philoso,~
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.i>hical program. Fries's later wr1tmgs, particularly his major
works, ehiborate the themes he first expressed in this article.
Thus, at the age of twenty-five, Fries had already developed
his own unique philosophical viewpoint. Though historically related to the thought of Kant, Reinhold, Platner, and Jacobi,
this viewpoint was a singular departure from the various systems
of these philosophers. We shall examine its methodological
and doctrinal innovations in the next section, and its psychological tenets in the section after that. Here we shall continue to
outline the history of Fries's life and individual works.
Following his polemical tract, Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling, Fries published two early book-length expositions of his
thought, first in 1804 for a philosophical audience (in System
der Philosophie als evidente Wissenschaft, or System of Philosophy as Evident Sdence) and then in 1805 for a more popular
audience (in Wissen, Glaube und Ahnung, or Knowledge, Faith, and Presentiment). In 1805 he was invited to Heidelberg
as professor of philosophy and mathematics. In Heidelberg, in
1807, Fries published his three-volume masterwork, Neue Kritik der V ernunft (New Critique of Reason), which, as the title
suggests, was intended to establish Kant's critical philosophy
on a new basis. In the second edition of this work, published
between 1828 and 1831, Fries amended the title to reflect the
precise nature of this new basis. It· was, he indicated, a Neue
oder anthropologische Kritik der Vernunft (New or Anthropological [i. e., Empirical PsychologicalJ Critique of Reason).
In the remaining years at Heidelberg Fries publish~d a number of works, including his System der Logik in 1811, a critique of Schelling's philosophy of art in 1812, and several tracts
on natural science in 1813. These latt~r tracts reflect an aspect of
Fries's work which has gone unnoted up until now - Fries's
inter~st in mathematics and the natural sciences. As early as
his time in the Academy of the Moravians, Fries excelled in
the study of both mathematics and the natural sciences, and he
continued his study in these two areas at Jena. In fact, in
1802 he published "Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Theorien des Lichtes und der Warme" (Essay on a New Presentation of the Theories of Light and Heat), and in 1803 he published a tract on Regulative fur die Therapeutik nach heuristischen Grundslitzen der Naturphilosophie aufgestellt (Regulations for Therapeutics Set Forth According to Heuristic Principles of Natural Philosophy). This tract on physiological thera220

peutics is a ,largely forgotten work which merits attention f<;>r
its very suggestive and innoyative ideas. For our purposes, hQwever, its major signif!cance is that it was an early ·presentation of ideas ·which wer~ given different, and more systematic,
eXP,ression in 1822,in Fries's important.Die mathematische Naturphilosophie (The Mathematical Philosophy of Nature).
This mathematical philosophy, and Fries's defense.of mechanical explanation i_n the natural _scieq.ces, put Fries into rather
direct opposition to the Naturphilosophie of the idealis~s. Opposing the use of teleology as an explanatory principle in natural
science, Fries went even further than Kant in philosoph~cally
justifying the «Newtonian» approach to natural sci~nce. Unlike Kant, who did not amend his evaluation of chemistry after
Lavoisier's work, Fries included chemistry among the natural
sciences proper, and he refused to admit the explanation of life
according to teleological principles. (In fact, it was his espousal of mechanical explanation in biology that led his disciple,
Matthias Jakob ,Schleiden, to important new results and theories in the study of pl,ant ,life) 2 • But the major point to be
made is that Fries was very well informed in the areas of
natural science and was an innovator in the philosophy of science 3 • In fact, he was one of the very few philosophers whom
German empirical scientists continued to respect aq.d read during the age of idealist philosophy 4• As we shall see, his con~ern about the sciences of «outer nature» which was his
only concern in Die mathematische Philosophie - was· accompanied by his interest elsewhere in the sciences of « inner natu-

2 Schleiden ( 1854), the founder of modern cytology, gave· credit to Fries for
having originally suggested the idea of explaining organic processes by analogy
with crystallization processes.
3 Besides extending Kant's philosophy of natural science to include chemistry
and biology, and adding morphological and phenomenological considerations to
the theory of movement, Fries is credited with important innovations in the
philosophy of mathematics. In fact, Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) has said
that Fries «is the real founder of modern axiomatics; for he was the first
not only to pose the problem of this science in general terms, but to work
at it systematically» (Vol. 2, p. 167).
4 E.g., Schleiden referred to Fries as the philosopher of natural science;
Alexander von Humboldt approved of his natural scientific works; and Carl
Friedrich Gauss, the great mathematician and astronomer, told a student that
his time at the university would be well spent if the but learned to understand
and value Fries's Die mathematische Naturphilosophie (Henke, 1867, p. 226).
For a review of Fries's philosophy of the natural sciences, see Nobis (1972);
regarding its impact on Schleiden, see Buchdahl ( 1973).
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re-». 'Though he maintain~d·that the natural· scientific study of
«:~?ter,,"ndture » wa~ .based.Ji>~~ ·diffe~ent .metaphysical (i. ~:,
conceptual or- cat,egor1cal) prµic1ples than the ~c1ences of « m·ner riatqre »,
di& not assign to tlle sciertces of outer nature
an epistemologically 'dif{erei'it 1itatmr. Both types of science; he
said, were ~qua1ly valid << theoretica1 sciences » ins,ofar as they
were both, founded fipoh a pridri principles. I shalf have more
~to 1 say'""ab'out the principles· of ·psychology later in this article.
Fries wrote l!>ie mathematische Naturphilosophie and va·rious .subsequent treati;;es op. mathematical and' natural scientific
topics{(the. most impottant being Fries, 18Z6, 1839, and 1842'
under gr~atly,changetl circumstances in tlle·post-Heidelberg years
of liis. 'life: Tnese changed conditions stemmed from his return
to. J'eha (as pfofessor Of theoretical philosophy) in 18t6 and
Hi.s involvement there. and 'at the Wartburg Festival of 1817 in
libetal, nat,ibpalistic political activities. In a series of private
arid· J]tlblic ,ad'dresses he encouraged the· _political aetivism of
student groups·. and W;as -Outspoken ill' his desire for constitutional' govetnm~nt: 'J'hese political convictions· anti behavior aroused the opposition of authorities in both Berlin and Vienna,
par.ticu1ably hfter a ·student who was loosely assdciated with Fries
mtitdetea1 a suspe€ted government -spy in< 1819~ Fries had already been passed bver in'. ·1818 as a, candidate for the chair of
pJ;lilosop]iy· in 'Berlin because of his political involvement; now
'he lost his posit!<;m at Jet).a. Not until 1824 was Fries reinsta"te&· at Jena, anti 'then only as professor of mathematics and
physics. AB:hough·'lie. was ·alloweel. to have a small number of
private students in philosophy, he did not receive full Lehrfreiheit (freedom in teaching) until 1838. That is, he was not
allowed to, lecture. pub],i.py -on. philosQphy for almost twenty
years - the· twenty years in which he 'Was at the height of
powers avd in which the idealism he so totally oppose.cl. conque'red the German academi,a.. w,arld. in the guise of Hegelianism.
It is very unlikely that Fries could have stemmed the tide of
speculative- idealism even under the best of circumstances. But
he might well hav.e become hetter known, and his philosophy
might have received greater recognition as a viable alternative
to· th~ reigning idealism, had he ·poi suffered political repression~ Indeed, if FJ:ies· had not· .been politically censured, he
very possibly would have recef{T,ed: the appointment to the ·Berlin· chair that went instead to Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,

ne

.222

who was then not as well known as Fries 5 • Had the appointment gone to Fries the course of German philosophy might
have been altered, slightly yet significantly. But as a matter of
historical fact Fries did not receive the Berlin chair, and the
fact that Fries was censured and lost his public audience at precisely the same time that a philosophy very different from his
own was rising to dominance was too great a liability to be
offset. Even though he commanded great love and respect
from the academic community at Jena throughout his exile
and the rest of his life, and although a small group of dedicated followers and natural scientists remained faithful to him,
Fries was never able to fulfill the promise of fame and influence that was his at an earlier age.
Nonetheless Fries was very productive in the years between
1819 and his death in 1843. Besides works in mathematics
and natural science, and numerous reviews and short works,
Fries wrote treatises on the philosophy of politics, ethics, aesthetics, religion, and the history of philosophy 6 • He also expanded the «psychic anthropology» that was the foundation
of his Neue Kritik der Vernunft into a book-length Handbuch
der psychischen Anthropologie (Handbook of Psychic Anthropology, 1820-21) with which we shall be concerned in the section on Fries's psychology. In 1824, he wrote his System der
Metaphysik (System of Metaphysics) in which he gave systematic expression to his distinctions between the metaphysics of
outer and inner nature; knowledge, belief, and presentiment;
and five different ways of viewing reality. And he took time
to revise his System der Logik in 1819 and again in 1837, his

5 Though younger by three years, Fries advanced much more quickly than
Hegel through the German academic system. Both had begun their teaching
careers in Jena in 1801, and both were made associate professors (ausserordentlicher Professor) there in 1805. But Fries was a far more popular lecturer and
also much quicker in developing and writing about his own unique philosophical
dewpo'nt. By 1805 he had written three books and was offered the chair of
philosophy and mathematics at Heidelberg. In 1807, when Hegel published his
fir>t book, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, Fries published his masterwork, Neue
Kritik der V ernunft. When Hegel finally received the call to a professorship in
1816, it was to the chair at Heidelberg that Fries had vacated in order to
occupy the more prestigious chair at Jena. Only with Hegel's appointment
o:t Berlin in 1818 did Hegel pass Fries in status and fame. See Kaufmann
(1966, pp. 92, 96, 176).
6 For a list of these and all of Fries's published writings, see [Fries's
Bibliography] ( 1937). Vol. 26 of the Samtliche Schriften, when it appears,
will contain a bibliography of writings by and about Fries.
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Neue· Kritik der Vernunft in 1828-31, arid his Handbuch der
psyc"hischen Anthropologie in 1837-39.
,
The total number. of Fries'.s writings, which will fill twentysix volumes in the completed modern edition of liis works, is a
testament to the fact that Fries was 11 very hard-working and
very well-round~d philosopher. His' interests were both theoreti·cal and pratical, scientific and religious, critical ana yet 'constructive. Though he denied that man can know the absolute 'truth
about reality, and thus criticized the idealists' belief that knowledge can be systematized once and for all 7 , he did assert
that man can, and should, reach a level of theoretical and practi·cal knowledge which will help him understand and direct his
life. Fries attempted to co.\}tribute to man's enlightenment in
'vittually every area of theory and practice. In doing so, he felt
compelled to oppose the· dominant philosophical tfends of his
day. In the following section we will concentrate on the central aspect of Fries's work that stands in particular oppositicin
to: early n'ineteenth-century Gerinari idealism - his psychological « completion » of Kant.
FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF KANT'S
CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY

As m:uch as Fries opposed the idealistic « completion » of
Kant,.he did not blame the idealists entirely for their tnetaphysical, or « transcendental», interpretation of the Kantian h_eritage. ·The fault, Fries felt, was to a great extent Kant's own. For
7 In oppos1t10n to the sti,eculative idealists, Fries felt that metaphysical
principles (intuitional forms, categories of understanding, and ideas of reason)
were regulative, not constittiHve. They cannot, he maintained, tell us about
fhe actual nature of reality; and systematizing them, however useful, can
never lead us beyond' the phenomenological limits of our knowledge to any
final, absolute truth. Indeed, Fries claimed that there are different ways of
«knowing», different points of view, or worldviews (Weltansichten); i.e.,
different «systems». of principles for understan~ reality. One can view
reality as physical, either explaining it according to laws or describing and
classifying it phenomenologically; or one can view reality from the viewpoint
of inner mentality; or according to ethico-political norms; or finally according
to religio-aesthetic ideals. Each approach is valid in itself, though the religioaesthetic view is the highest possible since it_ puts one in touch with the
highest of values. But the religio-aesthetic view is not knowledge in the narrow
sense. It provides a «presentiment» of absolute reality, not the certain
knowledge that the idealists claimed to have reached.
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as brilliant as Kant was, and as epoch-making as were his discoveries, he had,failed in the final analy~is to definitively establish
the critical philosophy (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xv, 28-31;
1820-21, Vol. 1, p. 100). That is, he had failed. to clarify and
justify the exact nature of the critical method. Having discovered the various a priori intuitions, forms, and ideas which characterize the human mind, he had not adequately specified and
validated the means by which he had made these important
discoveries. Indeed, he had not even addressed himself to the
issue, and he had unwittingly complicated the problem in the
second edition of Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Critique of Pure
Reason) by substituting a «transcendental» (or «objective»)
deduction of the categories of understanding in the place of
the « subjective » deduction found in the first edition. In a
very short time, the development of the implications of this
transcendental deduction.led to speculative idealism, even though
Kant himself (1781; 2d rev. ed., 1787; trans:, 1965) had
vigorously denied that his approach constituted a transcendental idealism and insisted that the revision of the second edition
represented no change in his thought (pp. 33-37 [BJ). Kanf
had not realized that this revision had introduced what seemed
to be a fundamental ambiguity into his doctrine. By doing so,
it planted the seeds of future dissent between the idealists
who followed the lead of the transcendental deduction and
Fries who maintained that the original edition of the Kritik
der reinen Vernunft, with its more subjective or psychological
approach, was closer to the true critical method.
The general problem involved in this issue was one that had
engaged Fries's attention since the very beginning of his study
of Kantian philosophy, namely, how did Kant come to his conclusions? Whereas Kant had sought a secure foundation upon
which to establish philosophy, Fries went one step further,
seeking to determine how such a foundation could b'e constructed. That is, Fries set himself the task of submitting tl;te critical philosophy itself to a critical analysis in order to determine
the exact nature of the critical method. Or, to express it in yet
two more ways, Fries wanted to determine how the critical
method provides knowledge and thus what kind of knowledge
is provided by the critical method. The idealists implicitly maintained that the critical philosophy, by means of transcendental
analysis, yields metaphysical knowledge about the nature of
reality. Fries did not agree.
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As mentioned in the' _hisrorical survey above~· Fries reached
his own view of the critical philosophy as "early -a.s 1798 in
"Ober das Verhiiltni's der empirischen P~ychologie zur Metaphysik". In this arti:cl~ Fries first ·expressed' his convictiol!
that; just as the critical philosophy is the foundation of metaphysics proper, so in turn kempirjcal psychology the foundation of the critical phil~sophy. At-bottom, Fries ·said, the critical meth,od provides lqlowledge by a ~egressive analysis which
begin~ with the empirical facts of consciousness; thus, the. critical method leads to empirical, not' ·metaphy$ical, kno\Vledge.
Tnbugh what comes to be known are the a priori forms of
~hought', the knowledge of these ·forms is itself a posteriori. It
is) the consequence' 6f an experienced chain of analysis. In
short.,, ·Fries maintained that we coine to know the a priori
forms 'in our th6ught only as a matter of' experience. Those
for.{b.s :themse1ves are there all the time, but before our critical
analysis we are not conscious of them, and they are not a
m::l;tt~r of explicit knowledge. The critical philosophy, then, although !it provides knowledge of the a priori and necessary
elements in our understanding, is itself an empirical science
based upon the analysis of cognitive states with which· we become familiar through self-observation. Thus, the critical philosophy dep_ehd,s !JPOn psychology!
~ T~is conclusion would have surprised Kant, of course, and
Fries knew it. Despite the fact th~t Kant's earlier « subjecti~e ». deduction was more c;losely related to Fries's program of
P.sY,cho~ogical analysis !ban was the la'ter « transcendental » deCluetion; Fjies· did not. claim that K~nt had ever explicitly used
a p·syc4ological method i.µ the 'first' edition of K.ritik der reinen
Verntmf~. ·~ncfoed, he contended that K;ant f!ever properly defined
oancl ;u~ilized 'the critical 'method (Fries~ 1807, Vol. 1, pp. xv,
28-'31'; 182p-21, Vol. '.I., p. 100). Had he done so, Fries said,
Kant cquld liave compl~t:ed the cr!tical philosophy himself. Since he ·hap ndt 4one so, :Pries published his major work, Neue
lf.ritik der Vernunft (1807)} in order to establish the critical
phil9sophy upon a proper-methodological basis and thus to tomplete what Kan't hatl begun.
:The· crucial defe~t in. Kant'~ ci;itique of reas~:m, acc9rding to
·Fries, was that, although Kant's (1781; 2d rev. ed,, ,1787;
trans. 1965) self-expressed goal had been to call reasoh «to
undertake anew the most difficult of all its ta~k~, namely, tliat
of self-knowledge» (p. 9 [A]), he had not understood that
'226

this ·goal could be 'reached only through self-obs~rvation.' If
one wishes to ~stablish the a priori"elements in ·knowledge, for
example, one .tfiilst ·begin by first examining actual bits of knowledge and then by a'Sking, as Kant did, what principles are
necessary for the- very possibility of this knowledge . . One ·cannot determine 'What is a priori in· knowledge· without first having some idea. of what knowledge 'is. Thus,. one must"proceed
according to a rigorous, two-step program, beginning with selfobservation (to learn about knowledge and the mental' prpces•
ses that lead to it) and concluding with a regressive analysis
(to abstract from ·actual instances of knowledge to the innate
principles of knowledge) (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 40-41, 68).
A discussion of both of these steps will summarize the essential nature of Fries's « new» critique of reason.
The basis of Fries's critical method - its first step .-- was
self-observation.. Through a careful phenomenology of the
mihd Fries hoped not only to determine the various types of
knowledge, but also to describe and classify the general types
of mental processes which constitute mental life. He viewed
the establishment of an adequate theory of the mind as a necessary preliminary to a critical analysis of the innate forms of the
mind (Fries, 1807, Vcrl. 1, p. 63). Indeed, he contended.that
many of the difficulties in Kant's analysis had resulted from
the fact that he had not be~n sufficiently critic-al ·at this"first
stage 0£ his critical philosophy. Instead .of' validating his the_ory
of mind through an empirical-investigation of mental ·phenomena, Kant had· simply assumed a· psychological theory;>which uncritically utilized several distinctions that had been. 'passed
down for centuries in logic an'.d psychology. The principal distinctions to which :&'ries referred were those between ·under.
standing and reason arrd between sensibility and intelligibility-.
Through his own psychological observations, Fries became con:
vinced that these distinctions were inadequate as understood
by Kant and were responsible for serious problems in his « transcendental» analysis of reason.
The problem \W.th Kant's· distinction between reason and understanding, according to· Fries 1 was that it kept' Kant from
really investigating «,pure reason ». as. he had .intended. For
when.he studied «-reason »,Kant studied only dialectical reason,
the faculty of' making inferen~es about reality. But how, Frie'!>
asked, does this dialectical reason differ £tom underst~nding,
which is the faculty of judgment? Dialectical reason; he maintai227

ned, is only a particular species of judgment; and so Fries
preferred, on the basis of the observed similarity between the
processes of judging and inferring, to include both under the
rubric of understanding, which he defined as reflective or mediated reasoning 8• Such reasoning, he said, falls under the control of the will and is thus a matter of voluntary choice. Reason, however, by which Fries meant pure reason, is not under
the control of th~ will. It is an autonomous activity of knowing. That is, it is spontaneous and involuntary. It is, in
short, the source of the a priori and necessary elements in our
knowledge 9 • This is what a critique of reason should investigate - not the dialectical illusions of reason, but the spontaneous activity of reason (i. e., the mind as purely active).
Kant's failure to adequately distinguish between unders.tanding and pure reason was directly related, according to Fries,
to his acceptance of the sensibility-intelligibility distinction. This
traditional distinction, Kant said, made the analysis of spontaneously active reason virtually impossible. For if the innate
forms cannot come from sensibility (and they cannot if they
are truly innate), then Kant could only assert that they were
an innate part of reflective intelligibility. But reflective intelligibility is a faculty of mediate and voluntary, not immediate and
a priori, knowledge. Thus Kant's disjunctive distinction between sensibility and intellegibility prevented him from positing a truly innate and non-mediated source of cognition.
To solve this dilemma, Fries proposed one of his major innovations. He introduced a third source of knowledge, distinct
from both sensibility and intelligibility. A priori forms of knowledge, he said, if they ;:tre truly a priori, can proceed neither
from immediate sensation nor from mediated reflections. They
must be immediate .(though not sensations) and cognitive (though not mediated). That is, the innate forms of the mind must
constitute a third source of knowledge - immediate cogni-

8 Regarding Fries's distinction and definition of (pure) reason and understanding, see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 302-321; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 24-27,
37-41, 50-52).
9 Fries referred to the pure-reason aspect of knowledge as « self-ilctivity »
(Selbstthiitigkeit). For his basic distinction of the pure (active) and the
receptive (sensual) foundations of knowledge, see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 7884); for a discussion of Fries's distinction of (pure) reason and understanding
(i.e., the reflective processes of thought, from which Fries had distinguished
reason), see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp. 238-257).
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tlon 10 •
By making this new distinction Fries was able to solve a
number of the problems· he· saw in Kant's analysis when he
moved on to the second stage of his critical method, the regressive analysis, or deduction, of 'the a priori elements in knowledge. Because he had shifted the· consideration of innate forms
from the level of reflective thought to a cognitive level prior
to reflection (i. e., to immediate cognition, or knowledge),
Fries not only avoided the confusion .of voluntary with involuntary mental eleµients, but more importantly he showed the
need for a new type of regressive analysis and a purely subjective process of validation. Whereas Kant in dealing with mediated, or reflected, intelligibility (or understanding) could speak
of deductive proofs of a priori forms, Fries pointed out that
such « proof » is impossible -in dealing with cognitive elements
which are truly immediate rather than mediate. One cannot
«prove» an a priori form by referring it to something prior;
one can only discover and describe it. That is, in the process of
regressive analysis from actual knowledge to the innate principles of knowledge, one can only point out what principles do
in fact' emerge at the end of the analysis. One can never justify
or prove these principles since they are immediate and independent of any other type of knowledge (Fries, 1807, Vol. 1, pp.
3, 39-41, 296-314,. 381-390; Vol. 2, ipp. 186-213).
By thus arguing that immediate, or a priori, cognitions can
be affirmed by a regressive analysis, but never proven in the
same sense that one can prove mediated knowledge by reference to its logical relation to given premises, Fries prepared the
way for a new « subjective » rather than· « trascendental » validation of knowledge. According to Fries, knowledge that can
be shown to be based upon immediate cognition is ipso facto
1o The references in the previous note are relevant to Fries's tripartite distinction of immediate cognition (or spontaneously active, pure reason), sensibility (receptivity), and intelligibility (understanding). Also see Fries (1807,
Vol. 2); the entire volume is devoted to the discussion and analysis of immediate cognition ( unmittelbaren Erkenntniss); see especially pp. 3-101. As
Nelson ( 1962; trans., 1970-71) has pointed out, Fries's doctrine of immediate
cognition depends upon his distinction between that which is simply immediate (but «obscure») in our knowledge and that which is simply immediate
(i.e., clear and distinct) to our consciousness. The 'immediate cognition of
which Fries spoke was immediate in the first sense. Though present in
knowledge as its regulative principles, immediate cognitions must be discovered by a process of analysis (Vol. 2, pp. 177, 203, 216). Nelson claimed
that Fries was the first philosopher since Plato to exploit this insight.
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true, not because we can prove it but because we hav~ no
.choice· but to .rely upo;rr 'it. Stat~,d. $fferently, Fries ,claimed
that human knowletlge"'is subjectively valid j.nsofar -as it relies
upon· the innate forms- .of t'h¢ II\ind. l'his « self-reliance .of. re~
~on » (Selbstvertrauen der VetJ'!unft) t}le fa,ct tpat. reason
automatically forms knowledge .in certain ways - is its best
and, only possible validation, By ~n- innate « fee]J.ng-for-truth »
human beings grasp the J;?henolhen0logical rea~ity of the world
(Fries,. 1807 t Vol. 1, pp. ~vii-xviii, 57-60; Vol. 2, pp.
)'86-213; 1824a,·p. 20).
With this line of argumentation Fries established the basis
of .his philosophy. The foundation ·of the ,certainty of knowledge, he.,said; was reas,on's immediate and imp4cit faith in, itself.
One need m>t attempt a circulaP pro@f of knowledge in terms
0£ the'·p@ssibility of experience;. a psychological analysis of ac·tual. ~owiedge, co,i\lbined· with- a. r~gressive analysis which trace,s .this- kno;wledge to its· ultimat~ reliance upon immediate
forms of cognition, will rev~al th(! ~asis· of knowledge.
Wjth Fries!& approach thus 'briefly summarizedi the natural
question is: how .did the 'C~tegories of und~rstanding which he
derived. by means of this ptocedure 'differ from those whieh
.Kant; derived? The answer: J;fot _at; all. F~ies perfectly agreed
witfo tP,e· conclusion of Kant;s own deduction; he simply did
not think that Kant correctly understo@d the psychological ba·$is of his own. ,philosophy, and that Kant mistakenly tried to
Pl;ove what can- only be· described.
. 'thqs, .the .cqief sigµificance of Fri~s, vis-a-vis the Kantian
,heritage,, is not•tha~ pe cqang~cj.~1).t'S·COnclusi:ons, but that he
tried. tb reforme the nature. of Kant's methG>d .. In so doing, he
radically <§hifred .tq~ c~cep.tto~ pf-.~ .~tatus ¢ psychology and
its 're~ation to. philosop,hy.: Whereas Kant had tontended that
psychology was only an empirical sciehce (by which he meant
that it was no true science at all) and that the proper method
of empirical psy~hology was observation of external behavior
and· not introspection (Leary, 1978); and whereas the idealists
·felt that psychology was 'at best a limited i(l,Ild one-sided investi;gatiop. ·of mental processes (Leary, 1980b); Fries, in investiga'ting the foundation of the critical method itself, concluded that
!he critical philosophy (and thus all philosophy) was based
upon the introspective science of .psychology! Agreeing with
Kant that psychology was an enipfrical science, Fries argued
that psych.Glogy could nonetheless be a true science, possessing
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its own 'unique metapliysical basis. :f'arthermore:, he s~id- that
psychology was the scienze of inner experience,and that therefo.:
re its, P.roper methpd, Kant notwiths~anc!ing, w~s introspection.
And since all ·knowledge is, a matter .of inner experience, Fries
maintained that psycholbgy is- iundamental to any other- science, incfuding the criticaI philoso2liy. O~ly through a .psychological investigation can the actual· processes antl a priori bases of
knowledge be identified.
Thus did Fries revise the conception of psychology. Psycliology was no -longer, as with Kapt, -seen. ·as «merely .eqipid.cal »; nor, as with the·~idealists, was- it s~en .as in- need .of
&upplementation by other more complete sci~nces. It w~s a
true and, autonom01.:is scjens:e .which itself supported ,all the
·other ·sci:ences.. lq the ·pqst-Kantian dev~lop!llent from antipsychologism Jd the em~rgence of a scientific psyc;hology, this
contention of Fri'es was ill/pprtant ·and. ·significant! We sl;all
investigate Fries's psychology in- the next section.

FRIES'S PSYCHOLOGY

Tn his earliest· writings, Fries- generally referred to the science of psychology as« empirical psychology» (e.g., F1ies, ·1798a,
b). However, by 1807, in Neue."Kritik dl!r Vernunft, he preferred to call his own psychology «"philosophical arlthropology. >~,
and in 1820, under the influence 0£. G. E. Schulze, he changed
the title of his psychology to « psychic anthropology » 11 • In
the second edition of Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1828-31:), in
which he again used the .title of «psychic anthropology»,
Fries explained why he had avoided the use qf the term
« psychology »:
Although this science is usually called psychology 1 w.e will deviate froin
this terminology· for several reasons. The word «psyche» (or soul) has
,been used in philosophy to designat~ the metaphysical, persisting, simple,
and immortal essence.bf .the spirit, and its use therefore''impj.ies certain
assumptions which we cannot' now entertain. We are only concerned- with
developing a dpctrin~ hf the nature of the human soul based upon "inner
11· Fries (182<Y-21; Vol. !; p . .5): freely, admitted that-:Schulze (1Sl5) haQ.
influenced his choice oft the term '<<psychic \lnthropology », but it.should •be
stressed· that Fries 'appropria.ted only the title from· Schulze; ili.e- substance of
Fries's own psychic anthropology was developed long• hefore Schulte's work.
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experiehce. Thus we will deal only with inner anthropology. In thus narrowing our scope to the hqman spirit, we arrive at ·the topic of empirical
psychology, or psychic anthropology. But our present task differs from
empirical psychology, which is ah experimental physics of inner life (eine
innere Experimentalphysik) which remains forever fragmentary. We will
not be satisfied with such a science. We want to achieve a [unifiedJ
theory of inner life, a doctrine of .inner nature, which will provide for
[the study of] our inner psychic nature what 'the philosophy of nature
now provides for physics. This part of psychic anthropology we want to
calJ philosophical anthropology (Vol. 1, p. 36).

Thus, Fries called his psychology 12 «psychic anthropology » both to avoid the metaphysical assumptions of the old
rational psychology and to indicate his dissatisfactioh with the
current « fragmentary » and mechanical empirical psychology 13 •
On the first account, in rejecting the old metaphysics of the
soul, Fries accepted Kant's critique of rational psychology; on
the second, in rejecting the metely empirical status of psychology, he disagreed with Kant's evaluation of the limited epistemological possibilities of psychology. Instead he maintained that
psychology need not be « merely empirical », that it can attain
the true status of a science, and, in other words, that its phenomena can be rationally organized according to metaphysical critefia. Kant (1786; trans., 1970) had denied this possibility,
claiming that the metaphysical principles of natural science were not applicable to psychology (p. 8). Fries agreed that the
principles which Kant referred to as .<<the metaphysical principles of natural science» could not be used in psychology, but
12

Though Fries preferred to call his psychology « psychic anthropology»,

it is perfectly justifiable to refer to his «psychic anthropology» as psychology.

He avoided the term « psychology » for the reasons given above, but he
himself ( 1820-21) said that psychic anthropology could be « simply called
psychology» (Vol. 1, p. 2). For that reason, the term «psychology» was used
throughout the previous section without qualifications.
13 Fries's opposition to « fragmentary» empirical psychology illustrates his
general opposition to a narrow-minded empiricism that advocated the collection
of facts without any .consideration of their relation to an adequate theory of
mind. Although strict empiricists claimed to be free of all need for such
theories, Fries pointed out that they nonetheless unwittingly assumed a theory
of mechanical association (the « inner physics » to which he referred in the
quotation above). Such a mechanical theory was based upon an analogy between inner and outer nature which might or might not be appropriate, but .
in either case it was not yet justified by the development of a critical theory
of the mind. When Fries developed such a theory, he found that the psychology of association did not ·provide a complete explanation of mental phenomena. Most importantly, as we shall see, it failed to account for the a
priori idea of association upon which associationist psychology is based.
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he pointed out that these principles were really « metaphysical
principles of outer nature », not natural science per se, and
that another set of metaphysical criteria was possible. These
alternate principles, constituting an autonomous « metaphysics
of inner nature», would make possible the development of a
truly scientific psychology 14 • By means of such criteria, or
« the metaphysical doctrine of our scientific knowledge of the
mind» (which is what Fries called the metaphysics of inner
nature in his System der Metaphysik, 1824b, p. 392), psychology could be more than a merely « fragmentary » collection of
data organized in a post hoc fashion according to the mechanical analogy of association; it could unify and explain these
empirical phenomena according to the rational laws proper to
the mind itself. Thus, psychology could be a true science 15 •
Fries not only felt that such a scientific psychology was possible; he offered his own « psychic anthropology » as the realization of that possibility 16 • Through a two-step_ procedure he
both gathered data and discovered the criteria by which these
data could be rationally ordered and understood. The first task
was accomplished by psychic anthropology proper, which consisted of a natural description of the various phenomena of the
human mind as they presented themselves in experience. The

14 As Fries ( 1820-21) put it, «we can not hope to achieve a correct treatment
of psychic anthropology without metaphysics. All empirical knowledge, including
empirical knowledge of inner phenomena, has philosophical forms at its
foundation. There is a metaphysics of inner nature which allows us to
determine the fundamental concepts of inner activity, its degrees, the faculties
of the mind, etc. Its principles can not be avoided in the description of inner
nature, even if one tries to disregard them. But in this case they will guide
description in a faulty way» (Vol. 1, p. 10). Fries distinguished the metaphysics of «inner» and «outer» nature most explicitly in System der Philosophie ( 1804, pp. 286-324) and System der Metaphysik ( 1824b, pp 354-429).
The distinctions made explicit in these works guided the development of his
psychic anthropology.
15 Even in going beyond Kant by maintaining that psychology, or «psychic
anthropology », could be ordered according to its own autonomous principles,
Fries remained faithful to Kant's definition of a true science as a body of
knowledge which is organized according to rational principles. This does not
mean that Fries denied that psychology was an empirical science. Just like
physics, psychology was to deal with empirical phenomena in a scientific ( rational) way, using a critically validated conceptual framework.
16 Fries's « psychic anthropology» was the culmination of the psychological
ideas that he began to develop in his 1798 articles and that found their fullest
expression in his Handbuch ( 1820-21). Other important formulations of
various psychological theses can be found in Fries (1803b, 1807, 1811, and
1824b).
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second task of providing a theory of mind .that could explain
these phenomena, by means of general laws was fulfilled. by the
deve1opme·nt of, a « philosophical ·anthropology » through a critical ·analysis of the descriptions of mental phenomena. The distinction betW.een.. the different procedures of psychic and philosophical anthropology was not as definite in practice as in
theory, however, as Fries himself admitted. The two tasks of
describing and explaining are not completely· separable. 0ne
carlnot explain something without having some idea (descriptionl·of what is to be explained. And conversely, a pure description'.is impossible, as Fries (1820-21) pointed out, because the
understantling automatically begins to generalize about phenomena in certain ·ways even as it attempts to describe them
(Vol. 1, p. 3). But this seeming confusion, this interconnection
of description and- explanation, is precisely what makes philosophical anthropology possible. By analyzing the principles implicit in the natural descriptions of mental phenomena one can
discover ·the metaphysical prindples of inner nature. Once discovered through introspection and analysis, these principles can
be used - and were used by Fries - to rationally organize
the observed phenomena pf the mind.
The first principle of Fries's « metaphysics of inner nature»
resulted from his most basic observation: all inner phenomena
must be conceptualized as activities 17 • Beyond that, all these
inner activities are expetienc\:!d as unified. Taking his cue from
Kant, Fries attributed this unifi'.ea nature of mental phenomena
to the existence of an "I", but he· also agreed with· Kant in
denying ·tlie,r possibility of' any )<nowlegge of the. ontologica~
nature of this experie~ced, '!I"! Thereby he rejected the possibility of h'tional ·psychology -arid its goal of absolute knowledge
.of the ~qul. Instead, . fr4:s corn;lyQ.ed, only a « natural doctrine
of the mind » built 'upon « regulative » or «.heuristic » principles
is possible, and these principles must be derived from the description and analxsis of the activities of the empirical "I" or
mind (GemiJth) .. .;
Obs~rv'.ation· of these mental activities leads naturally, Fries
maintained, to the analytical classification of them into several
fundamental categories, or «faculties» (Gemuthsvermogen).
17 The following discussion of the «JD.etaphysics of inner nature». is based
on Fries (1804, pp. 340-348; 1807, Vol. 1, pp. 65~106; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp.
1-89; 1824a, pp. 64-69).
·
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These· faculties, he- stressed, do not designate really separable
processes 18 • If they did 1 the basic principle of. the urtity of.. the
mind would be violated. Rathel', 1his classification of activities
is only a means of expressing. the regularities· in menta1 activity. Nonetheless such a classificatiort is an ·important task sinte the phenomena of hiner life cannbt be understood unless
they are ordered systematically- according to a rationally comprehensible scheme 19 • And this scheme, even if onl9' « regulative», is hot at all arbitra.ry since it must be reached and confirmed by the analysis of the facts of consciousness. Indeed, Kant's tripartite classification, Fries claimed, and· all prior divisions
of the « faculties » of the mind, were inadequate. Contrary to
Kant's distinction of thinking, feeling, and tlesire, a thorough
analysis of introspective descriptions revealed to Fries ·that the
fundamental categories of .mental activities are knowlecfge (Er:
kenntniss), inner disposition (most often referred to as ·Gemuth
or Herz), and activity (Thzztkraft). In other words, Frres maintained that Kant's distinc;tion of feeling and desire does ·not
withstand critical scrutiny. Both, he said, are always conflated
in inner disposition 20 • But he found reason to maintain the
number of mental faculties at three when he discovered that
the phenomena of willing, or self-control, are conceptually di.
stinct from the phenomena of knowing and having a (positive
or negative) disposition toward a thing. One can choose td act
contrary· to either knowledge or disposition, and so « activity»
is conceptually distinguishable frQm the-se other -faculties, ~r
capacities, of the "I" 21 ,
.
These three faculties, then, were the result of· Fries"s- analysis of various mental phenomena. However, the·use of the principle of mental faculties alone was not sufficient, according to
Fries, for an understanding of these phenomena. Anotlier set
18 In fact, in: the actual course of mental life, Fries said, all three fa1,:ulti~s
are more or less involved in every activity.
19 Fries was aware of the arguments ·against faculty psychology, but he
answered that some kind of conceptual classification of mental activities is
necessary.
2o This is the old Wolffian approach to feeling and desire.
21 Although Fries ( 1820-21) called for a clarification of psychological: vocabulary as a prolegomenon to any advancement in psychology (Vol. 1, pp.
12-13), several of his distinctions are liable to cause confusion. Thou~h all
the faculties are « activities », he called the 'third faculty « activity 1$ in a
narrower sense. Similarly, Fries used- the word Gemuth sometimes to mean
mind in general and sometimes to refer to the faculty of inner disposition.
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of principles was needed to ~ccount, for· the observed development of these mental· capacities over time. A child does not
think like an adult; nor does a child have the dispositions or
the will-power of an. adult. To account for these observations,
Fries proposed anather set of « heuristic» principles, a genetic
scheme of developmental stages. Each faculty, Fries said, goes
through three stages. of development in which its activity is
governed first by sensation, then by habit, and finally by understanding. That is, the faculties are first stimulated into activity
by a sensual stimulus (sinnliche Anregung, or Reiz) 22 • Then, in
the course of ongoing experience, habitual modes of activity are
developed according to« the laws of memory, custom, and association-»; i. e., according to the lower mental processes. Finally, the human mind comes to rule itself by means of understanding and the laws of the higher mental processes 23 • By
combining the structural categories of the faculties with this
genetic schema of stages, Fries arrived at a very complex and
dynamic conception of mental activity.
This brief summary of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature»
points out the most important principles upon which Fries
built his «psychic anthropology» - the principles of psychic
activity, unity, faculties, and stages. Of these, only the schema
of stages was in itself radically new 24 • And of the stages that
he posited, the third was the most innovative, involving as it
did the distinction between understanding tnd thinking and an
entirely new approach to understanding. Understanding, according to Fries, was not so much a particular faculty as it was
the highest developmental stage of each faculty. More specifically, it was « the power of self-control'» (Selbstbeherrschung)
through which a man becomes capable of developing himself.
This power of self-control, according to Fries (1820-21), was
22 Among the primary principles of Fries's «metaphysics of inner nature »
is this proposition that reason, although it acts in a self-determined manner,
needs to be stimulated into activity. This dual character of reason is expressed
as its «receptivity» (openness to stimuli) and «spontaneity» (autonomous
behavior, once stimulated). See Fries (1807, Vol. l, pp. 139-148).
2 3 Fries's concept of the mental stages developed more over time than his
other basic ideas. It is notably missing or in only seminal form in the earlier
works. For the best treatment, see Fries ( 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 62-89, especi~
pp. 62-63).
24 As noted below, others were taking a « historical » view of « the soul »
in Fries's time, and he might have been influenced by. such individuals. However, Fries's own schema of stages was original.
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the·fundamental idea (Grandgedanke) of his psychic. anthropo·
logy (Vol. 1, pp ..v-vi, 16) 25 • A perusal of the structure of his
Handbuch der psychische Anthropologie confirms his assertion. After'the first part of this work, in which Fties reviewed
the variety of·psychic phenomena and analyzed these phenomena into faculties and st~ges, the next three parts are concerned
wit4 a detailed discussion of the development of each faculty
to its fullest extent ·- i. e., to the point where t4e mind
controls itself through understanding the goals of each of its
faculties. The faculty of knowing, for instance, being the « speculative area qf human life», reaches its fullest potential when
it is «under the control of kt}owledge or .[in other words]
under the idea of truth». The second, or «contemplative»,
faculty develops toward « the control of inner disposition or
the idea of beauty »; and the third, « pratical » faculty is most
fully actuated «under the control of the will or [in other
words] under the idea of the good » 26 • Thus. at the point of
mature development the mental activities of thinking, being, disposed, and willing are carried out under the guidance of a
proper understanding of .the « regulative » ideas which provide
the « heuristic » ends towards which these various aetivities
should be consciously directed.
This completes our brief sketch of the basic principles and
propositions of Fries's « psychic anthropology ». It does not, of
course, provide an outline of all of his psychological doctrines.
For instance, nothing·has been said about his doctrine of sensation or his theory of association, although 'Fries had new and
important things to say regarding both of these lopics
(Hoffding, 1894-95; trans., 1955, Vol. 2, p. 244). Nor have
we reviewed his genetic theory of experience (Erdmann, 1866;
3d rev. ed., 1878; trans., 1890, Vol. 2, p. 456) or his innovative dis.cussions of psychopathology 27 • But we have discussed
the fundamental points of his psychology, enough to facilitate
the consideration of Fries's development of the conception of
the nature and methods of psychology in the next and final
section of this article.
25 Regarding «understanding» (Verstand), see Fries (1807, Vol. 1, pp.
302-321; 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 50-62).
26 See table of contents, Fries ( 1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. xi-xii).
27 The major source regarding Fries's ideas about psychopathology is Fries
(1820-21, Vol. 2). It is interesting to compare the mature ideas in this work
with the seminal ideas about physiopathology in Fries ( 1803b).
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-CONCr.USrON:. FRIES ANp ~THE .CONCEPT.Ut..L
DEV...EL0PMENT OF .P SYCHOLOGY
0

F.r.ies agr~~d with !\ant that psycP,oiogy was an empirical
scienae, :but }le did n0t think th11t psychologic;_al ~cience was
<< mer(]ty empirical i> •• Even- the most.« fr~gmentary » type of
empwiq1l· psycholp,.gy - i. e.,.associati0riist ~sychology, the « exp~liroeptal .physics of inner life » tQ.at Fries (l~Q7) criticized
(V.ol. 1, p. 36) - w_as }}.Ot totally empirical. Af.ter an; its observations were guided and unified ·by tbe idea of association, an
i<l~a which, Fries pointed out, could not itself be the product
of association 28-; Thus, even, this most elemental approach to
empirical psychology was based upon a rational principle that
wasinot a product of experience. And beyond association, additional ..rational principles could be 'discovered for psychology,
Erie~, iQ.sisted) by m~ap.s ~f ~ regressive analysi& applied to the
dat~ "df.e~erie.nce. In ffict, as we J1ave seen, he him§elf offered
a. complete doctrine of inner nature, a. unified set of rational
p,rinciples that would provide for p.sych0logy what the doctrine
of outer nature had already provided for:. physics - an a priori, r~ti.onal basis. Upon this rational basis, Fries said, a ~ruly
scientific psychology could be develeped.
,Fries's itllportant innovation, then, was to assert that« inner »
experience is guided by « metaphysical » principles as certaialy; and.as knowably, as «outer» experience. Kal].t had not
invented the distinction between the inp.er and outer spheres
of experien~e, but hi$ philosophy greatly reinforced tPi~ basic
duali&m. l}s a iesult of his works the problematic split bet~
ween m1lh and natu,re, or freedom and_ determinism, became
p'3tt of the standard -intellectuttl heritage -0f the nineteenth centory. Accordj.ng to Kant, only external phenomena can be known
according to rational crit~ria; i. e., only external phenomena
cap be the oqjects -0f t.rue science. Fries acceptd t;he dualism -0f
man and nature, the inner ai;:id the outer, but he maintaihed
that inner phenomena are equally .subject to rational principles,
albeit their own unique set of rational principles. Thus, Fries
created a dualism of« metaphysics » (i. e., epistemology) by pro28 Regarding association, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 1, pp. 33-37); also, Nelson
( 1962; trans, 1970-71, Vol. 2, pp. 200-202). Fries did not oppose associationist .psychology per se, but only its cruder form in whiCh no distinctions were
made between the lo\1/er and higher (will-controlled) thought processes.
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viding « grounds for knoWledge ·>$ 'tll.36Ui· man's inner life that.
were .different, from t\le principles which guide our natur~ knowledge .of :the ~~ternar world. in this. w~y 1i'ries begaµ the
quest,,for the epistemologicaLfo4ngation.of the h,uman sci<;:nc~s
which was continued by Dilthey; Windelband, Rickert and
others later in the century 29 •
Thus Fries defended .a·dualiSm of the« inner» and« outer»
sciences. Both types -of science have their own rational ,basis,
he said, at).d both have a unique conceptual ·structure.. ~oth '.ire
valid theoretical sciences. However, Fries. diet not: .feel that >the
«.metaphysics of inner nature '>»was in every· .respect parallel to
tbe « metapnysics of. l'>uter nature>~, and 1he· clifferenceJ.s ~nifi
cant: For "!llthougll there ate prificiples for understanding inner
phehomena ·just as there· are principles for understandin~ outer
phenome:na, there is: nothing in psychological science, as far as
Fries could tell, that can replace tho~e partkular ,rational·principles by which' the forms of sensibi~iiy are made ibt~lligl.ble .1n
the physic'al sciences. Tha~ is, there is nothing to replace mathematics. This, we shoiald •recall (Leary; 1978), was a major
point in Kant's critique 6£ psychology. Inner phenomena, having no,spatial dimensions or relations, are only temporally se_,
quential. Thus, Kant concluded, they cannot be subjecte3 to
mathematical, i. e., to ideal rational treatment. 'Freis agreed with Kant> that any complete explanatfon of natunal phenomena
must utilize mathemati'cs and-that insofar as psychology is·una-·
ble to express its obs.ervations frt a mathem:atical furm its ~pla
natory power is limited'. Thus he concluded 'that psJchoiogy,
can never offer as complete an 'explanatibti bf 'its phenomepa
as can phy_sics. However, this does not -mean that. psycholqgy
has no explanatory power at all. Fries's 1hought on< this point
was expressed succinctly by his twentieth-century disciple, -Leo1

29 Fries also developed the concepts ol worlpvkw ( W eltansicht) and value.
Whether or not Fries's frn::mulations of these .concepts were a direct influence
upon Dilthey, Windelbllnd, etc., who utilized relat'ed concepts, has not been
established. It should also be noted that Fries's assertion that' inner life ·is
subject to rational principles is not a defense of the possibility of a rational
psychology, as traditionally defined. F,ries was as emphatic as Kant in rejecting
the possibility of knowing the noumenal nature of the spul or "I". Wh,en
Fries claimeq th!\t psychology could be hased 'upon rational· principles' he .was
referring to «regulative», not «constitutive», principles. Just as' the principles
of outer nature, i:is presented in Kant's and 'Fries's natural philosophie~, were
purely regulative gui9es to scientific thi!lking, so too were .Frjes's principles
of inner nature.
·
•
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nard Nelson (19621 trans., .197.0-71):
Psychic phenomena ,cannot be measured, so theoretical explanation of
them is possible only i!.l a limited degr~e. But that is not to say that they
cannot be theoretically eiplaihed at all, for they can, within the limits set
by the impos~ibility of measurement (Vol. 2, pp. 258-259).,

In other words, Fries argued. that psychology can still offer
theoretical explanations even though these necessarily lack the
apodictic force of. mathematical formulations. The rational principles of inner experience, though in a sense more descriptive
than explanatory, do provide a framework. within which to understand psychplogical dynamics. As pointed out early in this
article, Fries denied any hard and fast distinction between description and explanation. Certainly, his developmental stages,
fpr instance, help to explain at the same time that they categorize mental phenomena. But such conceptual explanation falls
short, Fries admitted, of the ideal set by the physical sciences.
What Fries contended, then, was this: even if psychology
cannot utilize mathematics, it can still be a legitimate theoretical science, although not a totally precise one. This is the
major contention as far as Fries is concerned. It epitomizes his
development of the notion of psychology as a science. Contrary
to Kant he felt that psychology, using empirical and introspective techniques combined with subsequent« regressive analyses»,
can be a true science even without mathematics.
Having said this, we can add that Fries was not as totally
pessimistic as we have implied regarding the applicability of
mathematics to psyc;J:iology. Though Fries certainly did reel
that the use of aQ.y precise and ·sophisticated mathematical-..measurement of mentaL phenomena is impossible, he also felt, in
the words of Leonard Nelson (1962; trans., 1970-71) again,
that
Comparison of size can be made in this field [i.e., psychology] in terms
of degrees by the metaphysical law of Quality that every sensibly perceived
quality has an intensive magnitude which can increase or decrease continuously (Vol. 2, p. 259).

Fries referred to this law as the law of continuity (Stetigkeit), and he said that it was the only mathematical law which
is applicable to psychology (Fries, 1804, pp. 343-344; 1824a,
pp. 66-67). Since he himself never actually applied this law to
express a psychological function in.mathematical terms, we must
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be cautious not to overevaluate' his qualification of Kant's general exclusion ef mathematics from psychology - aJl the more
so since Kant himself expressed a similar qualifi~ation. Nonet~e
less Fries's step away from Kant's « official» position becomes
significant in view of the later developments in psychology 1ctt
the hands of Johann Friedrich Herbart (Leary, 1980a).
With this discussion of the possibility of mathematics in
psychology our comparison of Fries's psychology with Kant's is
completed. It should now be instructive to turn for a moment
to a comparison of Fries's psychology with that of the idealists, for although Fries's psychology was primarily developed
from Kantian foundations, it was also developed in the context
of opposition to idealism. Despite this opposition, there are a.
number of similarities between the idealist approach to psychology and Fries's psychology. This should not be surprising given the
common background of both German idealism and Friesian philosophy: Besides the common grounding in Kantian philosophy,
~oth approaches are historically related to R~inhold's « elementary philosophy » with its emphasis upon « consciousness », and
both approaches develop this theme as a central aspect of their
psychol~gy. As a consequence, both approaches also stress the
role of introspection. Beyond this, there is in both approaches
a common emphasis upon the activity of consciousness. In this
regard Fichte, Fries's erstwhile teacher, was probably an influence upon Fries. Fries seems also to have been influenced by
Fichte's stress on the will and his moralistic concerns about
the individual's relation to society 30 • And finally, there is a
striking resemblance between the idealist tendency to take a
genetic, «history of consciousness » approach ·and Fries's concept of mental stages and his concern with the genetic development of mental capacities and incapacities 31 • It is possible,
though not necessarily the case, that Fries was influenced in
this regard by his reading of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von
.
Schelling's works (e. g., Schelling, 1803).
Against this background of agreement we could place as
many or more points of disagreement. Idealists generally oppo30 The stress upon will is seen in Fries's view that the highest development
of each mental faculty consists in its subordination to the will, or self-control,
of the "I". Fries's concern with the relation of the individual to society is
ap~arent in his works on ethics and politics (e.g., Fries, 181848).
1 Regarding the development of individual· differences in mental abilities
and the development of mental illness, see Fries (1820-21, Vol. 2).
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sedJaculty psychology, for instance,.while_Fries stp.unchlY, defended it .. And Schelling's philqsophy of identity·rinspired many
idealist psychologists to speculate, on the relations between the
mind and the body (Leary, 1980b), whereas Frj.es (1820-21)
opposed such speculation on the.. ground that kn9wledge of the
«inner» and the.<~ outer», being subject to di{ferent « metaphy&ical » p.rinciples; is incommensutabl~ (.Vol. 1,. pp. 6-7) 32 , But
little will be gained by a mere r~cjt~tion o.f random points of
difference. The· central issue of co.(lcern in this article is the
c.;onception of the nature and methods of psychology. Regarding ithis fundamental issue, the two approaches could not be
more .different. Fries saw psychology as an empirical science
;whereas the idealists consid~red it a rational science. To be
sure; in pmctice the distinctiop. might seem less drastic because
Fries l1sed im;thods of rational analysis and idealists sometimes ,used empirical observations to confirm or illustrate their
dialectics, but the distinction is nonetheless quite real. Fries
began ).Vith observations, then used« regressive analysis » of thel5e observations to establish rational principles which he then
used as a basis for further observations .. The idealists, on the
other hahd, either began with speculative principles and wo'Q'e
their psychological systems 'Yith deductions and dialectical reasoning, or they began with empirical observations (commonly
view~d as « obstacles » to be ov~rcome by dialectical analysis)
flQd proceeded beyond the bounds of experience (and often beyond afocus-0n the individual) as they devel9ped a philosophy of
the mil).d ·which traq.scern;led the scop·e of psychology. In either
~ase'Jhey suportlinated· th,e :empirical study. of tl:ie individual to
,specqlativ~ .t"easoning, and this is what Fries vociferously opposed. His own analysis -and use of rational principles, he claimed, was always critical and regulatiye, never speculative and
constitutive. If at times .his ~ritical temper seems from our
historical vantage poil}t a bit lax, this was the result of the
execution, not the formulation, of his methodology.
Iq the realm of conceptual definitions, then, Fries's approach to psychology was definitely .distinct from the approach of
the idealists. No matter what similarities may have existed between their approaches, idealist psychologists did not formula32 Fries admitted a place to « comparative anthropology », the empirical
science of the correlative changes in mental and physical phenomena, but he
denied any pos~ibility of deducing from these facts anything regarding the
metaphysical essence, or relation, of mind and body.
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te, as did Fries, a new definition of psychology as an independent, empirical science. Their role in the development of psychology deserves more attention than it has received, but in the
history of the conceptual development of psychology qua scientific they are less important than Fries. Indeed, Fries's contribution consisted precisely in producing a definition of psychology
that served as an alternative to the idealist conception of psychology as formulated by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel and followed with more or less consistency by the next generation of
idealist psychologists (Leary, 1980b).
As a result, Fries's psychology was not given a rousing welcome in the early nineteenth-century heyday of German idealism.
Fries did have some followers, but few of these devoted themselves to developing his psychological doctrines 33 • In fact, the
most significant influence Fries had, in terms of the ongoing
conceptual development of psychology, was not upon his avowed disciples, but upon two independent thinkers who, like
Fries, opposed the dominant idealistic orientation of the time
and acknowledged Kant among their intellectual forbears 34 •
To these two men, Johann Friedrich Herbart and Friedrich
Eduard Beneke, Fries bequeathed the conception of psychology
as an autonomous and empirical science based upon self-observation and utilizing regressive analysis and regulative rational principles. Neither Herbart nor Beneke accepted this definition of
psychology in its entirety. Herbart (1824-25), for instance, rejected regressive analysis and attempted to make psychology into
a mathematical science as well as into an empirical science a la
Fries; and Beneke (1845), who accepted what he took to be
Fries's « psychologistic » starting point, argued in addition that
33 A notable exception was Heinrich Schmid, whose ( 1834) treatise set
forth the foundation of Fries's psychology in classic form. Regarding Fries's
discipleG, see Eggeling ( 1878, p. 79), Erdmann ( 1866; 3d rev. ed., 1878; trans.
1890, Vol. 3, pp. 109-110), Henke (1867, passim), Steinmetz (1958, p. 394),
and l1eherweg (1862-66; 12th rev. ed., 1923-:ZS, Vol. 2, p. 203).
34 Fries's influence upon Rudolf Hermann Lotze also deserves to be mentioned. For some of the facets of this influence, see Woodward (1977). A
fuller discussion of this topic will be found in Woodward's forthcoming intellectual biography of Lotze, now in preparation. It is also appropriate to
acknowledge the development of a neo-Friesian school of philosophy in the
early twentieth century (Henry-Hermann, 1967) and the contention that
Fries's theory of developmental stages (nrunely, sense, habit, and understanding) directly influenced Karl Biihler's later tripartite developmental scheme
(Wolman, 1968, pp. 240-241); see Nelson ( 1962; trans., 1970-71) and Buhler
(1918; 9th rev. ed., 1967).
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the « New Psychology » "tould, and should, become an experimental science.
These -dev~lop~ts, ·originating from the work of Kant and
channeled through the work of Fries to that of Herbart and
Beneke, have been traced elsewhere (I.:eary, in press). The central point to be repeated here is that tqese developments led to
the work of Wilhelm Wundt (1874), who is generally regarded as the founder of modern scientific psycllology. Since the
time of Wundt, psychology has turned toward a course that is
now under critical examination (Leary, 1979). It is appropriate to conclude this review of Fries's psychology with the commefit· that, as the « cult of empiricism » in psychology slowly
atrophies (Toulmin & Leary, in press), the wor.k of Fries who championed both empiricism and rationalism and saw them
as intimately connected - might bear closer examination. Despite Beneke's « psychologistic » interpretation of Fries's psychology, Fries himself was not a simple prqponent of psychologism,
as' has often been assumed 35 • His blending of rational analysis with empiricism suggests at least one alternative epistemology for contemporary psychology. No doubt the~e are other
alternativ!!s as well. As psychologists search for these alternatives (see, e. g., Koch & Leary, in pressh it might. be useful for
them ~o be reminded of Fries and of other aspects of the lost
heritage of their discipline. While the essential ideas of Fiies
and others (including Wundt himself)'will certainly not be translatable, without_·change, into ihe current, developing conception of psychology as a science, they m€ly offer fresh per~pecti
ves 'that will reveal « new » avenues leading beyond the positivist framework'that has dominated scientific psychology for so
lohg, despite the rationalism of its founding fathers - and
forefathers.
35 Interestingly, Edmund Husserl (1900), whose phenomenology was based
on the rejection of psychologism, never mentioned Fries in his work (Welch,
1941; 2d ed., 1965), which implies that Husserl was a better reader of Fries
than have been many others. On psychologism, and the assumption that Fries
was the founder of this « subjectivist » approach to epistemology and logic, see
Abbagnano (1967). Of course, Fries was a proponent of psychologism to the
extent that he saw psychology as the most fundamental of all sciences, but he
was not a simple-minqed proponent of psychologism: he did not advocate the
reduction of the principles of logic, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, etc., to
the status of mere accretions of psychological experience. Rather, as we have
seen, · h~ contended that these principles were discovered in (rather than
produced by) experience.
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Summary - Most German philosophers in'the early nineteenth century were
devoted 'to tl1.e idealistic «completion» of Inunanuel Kant's.critical' philospphy.
Ai.ew independent.,philosophers, 1:iowever, were preoccupied with the elaboration
of a non-idealistic, and less speculative, conclusion to Kant's thought. Among
the '~ii,rliest · opponents iof ,the speculative idealists was Jakob Friedrich Fries,
one a~ect of ·whose 'influence 1s of particular interest: in his reaction against
ideali.Sm, and in his own « completion » of Kant, he laid the foundation for the
development_ and acceptance of psychology as an independent science.
Maintaining that knowledge of the transcehdent ·is impossjple, Fries concentrated; as 'did Kant, upon the: discovery of the critical bases of knowledge. In
doing sO, he revised sofne of Kant's fundamental assumptions, atguing not
only that psy<;hology could become a science but that, in fact, psychology is the
fundamental science and the foundation of all philosophy, including Kant's own
critical ·philosophy. Having made these argument5> he developed a «psychic
anthropology» upon which Ire hoped to establish a steady and lasting psychology.
His efforts inspired subsequent thinkers whos<;. works, in combination with his
own, led to the emergence· of scientific psychology. Today some of his ideas
are_ still 'worthy of critical review.
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